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Abstract
Although Canada is contemplating major reforms of welfare policy, there is scant information regarding the use of
welfare. This paper rectifies this situation by documenting the dynamics of welfare participation in British Columbia
over the period 1980-1992. We find:
• most welfare spells are shorter than 6-months (75%)
• a little more than 10% last longer than a year
• almost no welfare cases last 4 years and those that do involve families with children
• single parents and older individuals have longer spells
• couples (with and without children) and childless single individuals have shorter spells
• the fraction of the caseload who are employable has been steadily rising from 38% in 1980-82 to 64% in 1991-92
• the fraction of the caseload who are single males has risen by 10 percentage points from 34% in 1980-82, while the
fraction of all other types of households have fallen
• the age structure of the caseload is virtually unchanged over the decade: over 70% are over age 25
• a quarter of welfare recipients are back on the welfare rolls within three months of leaving, while a full 50% return
within a year
• some couples and single individuals without children exhibit a strong seasonal pattern in welfare return rates
These patterns suggest several conclusions important to policy: first, governments need to focus on helping
individuals become self-sufficient and remain off-welfare more than encouraging quicker exits; and second, it may
be more efficient for governments to target special programs at single parent families who remain on welfare for a
long period of time, taking account of their needs and circumstances.
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The current social assistance programs in Canada were established, under the Canada
Assistance Plan of 1966, to provide financial assistance to all individuals and families in need.
Over the past two decades the number of social assistance recipients in Canada has increased by
almost 120 percent and total government spending on welfare has more than tripled in real terms.
Consequently the welfare programs have come under increasing public and governmental
scrutiny, with the federal government committed to implementing major reforms to the income
security system, of which social assistance is an important component.
In order to evaluate alternative welfare reform proposals it is important to be informed
about the pattern of welfare use and how that pattern varies with the characteristics of the
recipients. For example, recipients may primarily use welfare as a form of transitional support,
easing a financial crisis during a brief period while out of the labour force. Alternatively,
recipients may use welfare as a substitute for labour market income and thereby remain on the
program for a number of years. If the welfare population is comprised of both types of users,
then it is important for the design of effective policies to be able to identify and target the
different groups.
However, despite the significance of the welfare system in Canada, both in terms of the
people it directly benefits and the public resources devoted to it, there is a very little knowledge
of how people interact with the system. A major reason for the lack of published research on
the use of social assistance in Canada has been the lack of suitable data sets. To study the
dynamics of welfare participation it is necessary to have a panel data set that both follows
individuals for a relatively long period of time and records program participation information.
Until recently, there has been no publicly available Canadian longitudinal data set4.
Several researchers have recently examined the incidence of social assistance receipt using
annual, cross-sectional survey data. Allen (1993) and Charette and Meng (1994) analysed the
incidence of welfare participation among Canadian lone mothers using the Census for 1985 and
the Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS) for 1989 respectively. Dooley (1994) analysed
changes in the incidence of social assistance income among lone mothers with multiple cross-
sections of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) from the period 1973-19915. The findings
of these studies are generally consistent with a simple, static model of welfare participation and
they provide important information on the characteristics of lone mother families that participate
in the welfare programs. However these studies do not examine other household types, especially
single men and women who represent a substantial portion of the welfare caseload at a point in
time and account for much of the dramatic increase in the caseload in recent years. Furthermore,
these studies do not provide any guide to the dynamics of the participation, such as whether they
remain on the caseload for a long period of time. To examine the intensity of welfare use, and
whether individuals are dependent on the program over a period of time, it is necessary to
directly model the distribution of welfare spell durations.
The vast majority of information about the experiences of low-income individuals with
4
. The first Canadian panel survey was Statistic Canada's Labour Market Activity Survey. The initial
panel followed individuals for the years 1986 and 1987. The second, and last, panel followed individuals
from 1988 to 1990. Although this data source has rich information on the labour market behaviour of the
interviewees, the short time period of the panels severely limit their useful in analysing the dynamics of
welfare participation. Sources at Statistics Canada suggest that up to 20 - 30% of social assistance is
unreported in the LMAS.
5
. These is substantial underreporting of social assistance income in the Census and SCF data as well as
the LMAS, which raises the issue of the accuracy of the model estimates based on single cross-sections.
Dooley's (1994) focus on changes in the incidence of welfare receipt and use of multiple cross-sections of
the SCF should minimise the biases that may result from the underreporting of welfare receipt.
labour market and welfare programs has been generated using U.S. data (see Moffit (1992) for
a thorough review). The general conclusions of this literature are that most welfare recipients
are single mothers, that most welfare spells are short (60% are shorter than 2 years) while the
majority of use is through long spells (Bane and Ellwood (1983,1994), Gritz and MaCurdy
(1992)), and that the notion of welfare being a migration magnet is unwarranted (Walker (1993)).
Finally, entry into welfare is generally not due to divorce or childbearing but rather changes in
labor market status. Exit is through marriage and work (Bane and Ellwood (1994), Gritz and
MaCurdy (1992)). None of these conclusions need hold for Canada because institutionally the
two systems are very different, for example single men and couples without children are eligible
to receive benefits in Canada and the Canadian welfare system is relatively much more generous.
Hence in an environment of policy reform, we are largely uninformed about the dynamics of
welfare use in Canada.
The research presented in this paper utilises a unique data set, derived from the
administration of social assistance programs in the Province of British Columbia, to analyse the
pattern of welfare receipt over the period 1980-1992. From the raw monthly caseload data we
construct spells of welfare receipt. We directly address the dynamic pattern of welfare use by
analysing the length of welfare spells in B.C.. We summarise the duration of welfare spells by
various demographic characteristics and then refine the information to describe recidivism and
the length of repeat spells as well as the length of time between welfare spells. The present
research extends the work of Bruce et.al (1993) by analysing the exit and re-entry rates for all
individuals and families that received social assistance in B.C., using nonparametric methods and
allowing for right-censored spells.
The paper proceeds by first explaining the institutional features of the Canadian system.
We then describe the data used and turn to documenting the changes in the social assistance
caseload using simple duration models. We describe overall use of the program and then focus
on the recidivism and how the spell dynamics are different for multiple spell users. The final
section concludes and draws out several policy implications of the main finding.
1. Institutional Features
(a) The Canada Assistance Plan
The universal social assistance programs presently in operation in Canada were established
under the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) of 1966. The stated objective of the Canadian welfare
system is to provide financial assistance to individuals and families whose resources are
inadequate to meet their needs, irrespective of the cause of the hardship. Under CAP, the federal
government sets broad guidelines on the eligibility criteria and implementation of the "needs test"
and undertakes to share equally with the provinces the costs of those programs6. The provinces
are responsible for administering the welfare programs and have much discretion in determining
the rules and benefit structure of their separate programs. Consequently there are considerable
differences in the welfare programs across the provinces and territories of Canada7.
Despite the diversity between the provincial welfare programs, they share many common
features, especially in relation to the central role of the "needs test" with which eligibility is
6
. Since 1991 the Federal government has placed an upper limit on the total payments under CAP to the
three "have" provinces of British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario. As a result, the Federal government
presently funds significantly less than half the CAP program costs in these provinces.
7
. In the provinces of Nova Scotia, Ontario and Manitoba there is a further division between the
province and municipalities in the design and administration of welfare programs.
assessed. To qualify for assistance a household must undergo a budgetary assessment which
takes into account both the household's basic needs and the resources available to meet them.
The amount of assistance is based on the difference between the calculated needs and resources,
subject to a maximum amount.
In assessing a household's needs, the individual's or family's employability is first
established, which determines how the household's assets are dealt with8. If the value of the
household assets are lower than the maximum allowable levels then the household's budgetary
needs are calculated. The provisions of the CAP prescribe that the assessment of need must take
into account the basic living items of food, shelter, clothing, utilities, personal and household
expenses. The provinces set maximum allowable amounts for each of these items. Next, the
resources available to the household to meet those requirements are calculated. The resources
include earned income, alimony and maintenance payments and government transfers such as
unemployment insurance and pension income. A deficit between assessed needs and available
resources qualifies the household for assistance. The actual amount of assistance paid depends
on the employability status, family status and size of the household. Table 1.1 presents the
maximum annual welfare benefits payable for several household types in each province and
territory in 1992 as estimated by the National Council of Welfare (1993a).
Since the inception of CAP there has been a dramatic rise in the number of Canadians
in receipt of welfare at a point in time. Table 1.2 presents the number of general assistance
recipients, including dependents, in each province and territory for selected years between 1970
and 1992. Over this period the number of welfare recipients in Canada increased from
8
. Households classified as employable are generally subject to lower asset exemption levels in the
assessment of benefit eligibility.
approximately 1.2 million people in 1970 to over 2.7 million in 1992, a rise of almost 120
percent. The onset of the recessions in 1974-75, 1981-82 and 1990-1992 resulted in large
increases in the welfare caseload. Disturbingly, there were no significant declines in the
caseloads in the years of economic and employment growth subsequent to the recessions.
Corresponding to the trend in the welfare caseload has been the substantial increase in the
amount of real resources spent on the welfare programs. Table 1.3 presents the total federal-
provincial expenditures (at constant 1992 prices) on the general assistance programs in Canada.
Over the 20 years from 1970 to 1990 the total costs of the general assistance welfare programs
in Canada increased by over 230 percent9. The largest increase in welfare costs occurred in
Alberta (284%), B.C. (277%), Ontario (278%) and Quebec (218%). The large increases in
welfare beneficiaries and program costs have provided a major impetus to call for reform of the
welfare system,
(b) Rules of the Welfare Programs in British Columbia
The objective of the paper is to describe the dynamics of welfare participation in B.C.
The social assistance program administered by the B.C. government, collectively known as GAIN
(Guaranteed Available Income for Need) is composed of six separate programs. Three are
supplementary programs: GAIN for the handicapped, GAIN for Seniors, and Old Age Security.
The other programs provide income assistance: Child in home of a relative, Age 60-64 benefits
and Basic Income Assistance (IA). Although Basic IA forms the residual category for individuals
ineligible for the other 5 programs, it represents the predominant share of the total GAIN
caseload over the 1980-1992 period. Given the general nature of the Basic IA program and its
9
. The real increase in the total spending under CAP, including general assistance as well as councelling,
residential care and administration costs, from 1970 to 1990 was over 300 percent.
predominance in the total GAIN caseload (as shown in Figure 2.1), it is the primary focus of this
paper10.
As noted above, the employability status of an individual is important in determining their
eligibility for assistance as well as the level of benefits. In B.C., a person was classified as
employable if they were not (i) 65 years of age or older (ii) temporarily or permanently unable
to work due to medical reasons (iii) a single parent with one dependent child under six months
of age or two or more dependent children under 12 years of age11 or (iv) a single parent required
to stay at home to care for a disabled child.
A household that is eligible for welfare may augment their income through earnings12.
Recipients can retain a fixed amount of their earnings, the "earnings disregard," without a
reduction in their benefits. The earnings disregard varies by family size and, in some provinces,
by employability. In British Columbia, for most of the 1980-1992 period, the earnings disregard
was $50 a month for singles and $100 a month for recipients with at least one dependent13.
Benefits are taxed back at a rate of 75 percent for all earnings in excess of the disregard14.
However more recently the B.C. government has implemented enhanced earnings exemption
10
. The Basic IA program also accounts for most of the monthly variation in the total welfare caseload;
the correlation coefficient between the monthly Basic IA and Total GAIN caseload over the 13 year period
is 0.99 .
n
. The definition of unemployable in relation to the age of the youngest child is most stringent in B.C.
and Alberta. In the other provinces and territories, generally a lone parent is classified as unemployable if
the youngest child is under school. However, in 1994 B.C. changed this to 12 years of age.
n
. Generally, welfare benefits are taxed-backed by 100 percent for every dollar of unearned income.
13
. The earnings disregards in B.C. were doubled in April 1992.
u
. For a comparison of the B.C. welfare program parameters with the other provinces and territories see
National Council of Welfare (1987, 19904993a).
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programs to improve the incentive for recipients to make the transition from welfare to the paid
workforce.
The benefit rates presented in Table 1.1 for the year 1992 show that B.C.'s IA program
is slightly more generous than the "average" province. For instance, B.C. ranked as 5th, 3rd and
7th most generous province in terms of the level of assistance paid to single employables, single
parents with one child and to couples with two children respectively. Table 1.4 shows the real
benefits paid for the different household types for several years from 1986 to 1992. Over the
seven years, the average annual increase in real welfare benefits was approximately 2 percent for
singles and lone parents with one child and less than 1 percent for couples with two children.
2. The Data
The data used in the analysis are from the monthly case records of the social assistance
programs in B.C. The raw data are a ten percent random sample of all individuals with an IA
history in B.C. during the period of January 1980 to December 1992. The sample consists of
87,288 individual records. Each record contains the individual's (or principal claimant's) birth
date, sex and a variable indicating under which B.C. social assistance program, if any, the
individual received benefits for each month of the thirteen year period. Additionally, the records
include variables indicating the individual's family type, number of dependents and employability
status for the corresponding months that the person was in receipt of social assistance.
Table 2.1 provides cross-sectional summary statistics on how the caseload has changed
over the decade by presenting the ratio of the number of category specific person-months to the
total person-months on the rolls in the time period. A number of attributes from this simple
summary are worth noting. First, the use of IA reflects it being a safety net for all family types
rather than a categorical program like AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) in the
U.S. which is targeted towards children. Only one quarter of IA cases are by single mothers and
only 30% are by families with children. Second, single individuals without dependents represent
over 60% of welfare recipients in any given month. Third, the use of welfare is evenly
distributed over the age spectrum: at a point in time, a quarter are less than 26 years of age, 33%
are between 26 and 36 and 41% are over 36. Finally, over the last decade more than half of the
caseload in a given month is represented by individuals classified as employable. These facts
are very different to the public's perception that welfare is used principally by young single
mothers.
There appears to be two regime shifts in 1982-83 and 1990-91. The first panel of the
table shows that over the last decade, the number of individuals who are employable has been
steadily rising from 38% in 1980-82 to 64% in 1991-92. This alarming finding is substantiated
by the number of single males rising from 34% in 1980-82 to 44% in 1991-92. Every other type
of household has fallen as a fraction of the total caseload: couples, and single females with and
without children use relatively fewer resources. The general trend is reinforced by the number
of cases receiving Basic Income Assistance rising from 72% in 1980-82 to 81% in 1991-92. The
age structure of the caseload has changed less dramatically over the decade. While most
recipients are over age 25, this fraction has only risen by two percentage points to 74%. The
source of this change has been an increase in the relative number of recipients between 26 and
36 years of age.
A spell of IA is defined as a sequence of consecutive months of Basic IA receipt. Some
care must be taken in selecting spell data that are appropriate for valid statistical analysis. We
do not include spells which began prior to the start of the data period. To include such left-
censored spells would require specification of the actual distribution that generated them. In
order to avoid making strong distributional assumptions, we drop left-censored spells and our
results are therefore conditional on all spells beginning after January 1980. For these spells it
is possible to determine the precise length of time on welfare unless the spell progressed beyond
December 1992. Although such spells are "right-censored" the statistical methods we employ
control for this and thereby provide unbiased estimates of the spell distribution. For each spell
of IA there is also information on recipient's sex, marital status, employ ability status and the
number of dependent children at the commencement of the spell. A spell of "off-IA" is defined
as the time between the end of an IA spell and the commencement of a new LA spell. From the
original set of 87, 288 individuals, a sample of 164,894 Employable and 41,1032 Unemployable
IA spells was generated. Table 2.2 provides summary statistics on the spell sample.
We would like to emphasize a number of features of these summary statistics. First, only
20% of spells are by individuals or families classified as Unemployable although they account
for nearly half of the population in receipt of welfare at a point in time. This is only possible
if spells by "Unemployables" are longer, which we clearly see: 75% of the IA spells by
Employables are from 1-6 months in length whereas only 53% of the spells by Unemployables
are of this length. A second feature of the spell data is that single men account for 63% of all
spells, couples for only 16% of the total, and single parent families for only 16%. Thus, it is
clear from a comparison with the point in time welfare receipt (single parents comprise a quarter
10
of the caseload) that single parents have longer spells on average than other family types15.
Thirdly, over 73% of all spells over this time period were by single men (53%) or single women
(20%) without children, further reinforcing the fact that single parents are not the predominant
users of welfare.
3. Characteristics of the Overall Welfare Spell Durations
Our goal is to document Canadian welfare use while correcting for bias problems caused
by right-censoring. Since we have access to a very large panel data set, we adopt non-parametric
methods to analyse the spell distributions. We use the Kaplan-Meier (source) estimates of the
hazard and survivor functions which statistically controls for right-censoring16. We proceed by
first analyzing the entire sample of spells by stratifying the spell distribution by individual
characteristics. The basic family types we examine are single men, single women and couples
with and without children broken down by employability status. The empirical hazard functions
are plotted in Figures 3.1-3.3 and the corresponding survivor functions are presented in Table 3.1.
Note that higher hazard or exit rates correspond to shorter expected welfare spells and hence a
lower survivor rate.
The figures have several striking features. First, there is negative duration dependence
in that exit rates are declining over the spell lengths considered. This means that the probability
of leaving welfare falls the longer the time on welfare. This finding is consistent with the U.S.
15
. As demonstrated in the bottom panel of Table 2.2, the discussion on the spell distribution needs to be
interpreted with caution because of the 164,894 welfare spells, 9.1% are right-censored and as expected,
this problem is most severe for the longer spells. Thus, as summary statistics for the spell distribution,
Table 2.2 presents statistics that are downward biased.
16
. The hazard rate at time T is defined as the probability that a welfare spell will end at time T
conditional on it having lasted until period T, while the survivor function at time T is the probability that a
spell will be at least T periods in duration.
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results for women and corresponds to several types of welfare models such as: negative
conditioning which depresses the desire to work; depreciated human capital lowering the offer
wage distribution; or, employer screening17. The reader should note this is only a correlation
because these results could arise from unobserved characteristics (also known as unobserved
heterogeneity). The apparent duration dependence may be due to some unmeasured
characteristic, such as motivation, with those most likely to exit welfare due to the characteristic
departing early, leaving behind a population less and less likely to exit. Therefore the finding
of negative duration dependence should be treated with caution.
Second, men, women and couples without children have virtually the same spell dynamics
after the first 3-months (couples have a higher initial exit rate). However, the presence of
dependent children is associated with substantial differences in exit rates: couples have a higher
exit rate than men who have a higher exit rate than women. While it is unclear why single
fathers should leave the rolls more quickly than single mothers, the finding for couples is
explainable through a model of lower fixed costs of employment for couples: they do not need
to pay for outside childcare. This view is reinforced by Figures 3.1-3.3 where the welfare exit
rate is presented for men, women and couples differentiated by parental status. While the exit
rate is lower for both single fathers and mothers than for single men and women, the exit rate
is virtually the same for couples whether they have children or not.
While the hazard rates illustrate the basic time patterns, the survivor functions provide a
natural measure of welfare dependency. Survivor functions for welfare usage are presented in
Table 3.1. The table shows that the median spell lengths are between 1 and 3 months for all
17See MaCurdy (1989) for a thorough discussion.
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groups except for single parents with children whose median spell length is closer to 6 months.
Each of the three family types without children display the same disturbing trend: 10% of spells
last more than a year and 5% more than two years. There are considerable differences between
families which are employable versus unemployable. Approximately 40% of unemployable
spells and only 20% of employable spells last a year.
Mimicking the findings in the U.S., the presence of children for single-parent households
significantly lengthens spells: of those on welfare, 30% of single mothers with one child and 37%
of single mothers with two children remain on IA for more than a year and 20-25% for longer
than two years. More importantly, over 10% of single mothers with more than two children
collect IA for longer than 6 years. This pattern is not seen for couples with children - their spell
behaviour is identical to childless households. Thus, long-term welfare receipt by single mothers
may be due to problems of overcoming the fixed costs of employment.
Additionally, single parents with limited labour market opportunities have little financial
incentive to leave welfare. Over the data period, real welfare benefit levels in B.C. remained
generally stable while the real value of the minimum wage declined appreciably (by one-third
from 1976 to 1992). Consequently single parents were financially better off on welfare in 1992
than working fulltime at a minimum wage job18. Given that maximum welfare benefits for single
parent families are well below the poverty line, it is unlikely that cutting benefit levels would be
effective in reducing the incidence of long-term spells. A more constructive policy to encourage
independence requires addressing the structural labour market constraints facing single parents,
such as low levels of education and experience and the need for childcare support, so that they
18
. This is based on calculations presented in National Council of Welfare (1993b:30-44).
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have access to jobs that pay well above the minimum wage.
4. Off-Welfare Spells
Features of the time off-welfare before another spell begins provide further clues about
how welfare might be being used. Figure 4.1 demonstrates that there is a pronounced pattern of
negative duration dependence for those off-welfare: the longer you remain off-welfare the less
likely you are to return for another period of welfare receipt. However, this conclusion does
have an important caveat. After an initial steep decline in the probability of returning to welfare
at the end of the first year off welfare, the probability of returning to welfare rises temporarily.
This might be a result of seasonal use of welfare by some individuals. Another important feature
of Figure 4.1 is that 14% of exits return to welfare within 1 month. While this may simply
reflect administrative inconsistencies or "churning", if we define an exit from welfare as 2
consecutive months off the program, over 9 percent of welfare exits are back on the IA rolls
within 2 months and 16 percent within 3 months.
To develop an understanding about which demographic groups show the presence of
seasonal returns, in Figure 4.2 we present plots of hazard functions broken down by whether
individuals are employable or unemployable, single or married, and with or without children.
The striking feature of these data is that we only see the seasonal pattern for couples and single
individuals without children.
Survivor functions for various demographic groups are presented in Table 4.1. There we
see that 25% of welfare exits are back on the rolls within 3 months, 50% are back within a year
and a full 60% have returned within 4 years. Repeat use of welfare is a significant phenomenon.
While one might initially have the view that repeat welfare use is a problem for single mothers,
14
in fact 43% of single men are back within a year after the first welfare spell we observe, and
62% are back on the rolls within a year of the end of their second spell! For single mothers,
43% are back within a year of the end of their first welfare spell, while 57% are back within a
year of the end of their second welfare spell. Therefore, although most welfare spells appear to
be relatively short, there is a very high incidence of recidivism. Continuous, long-term use and
dependency on welfare is not a characteristic of most welfare recipients. However welfare does
not appear to be effective in providing transitional support, for most welfare users periodically
return to the program. Either many individuals are chronically poor and neither able to gain serf-
sufficiency nor end a repeating cycle of poverty, or, many individuals are using welfare in
conjunction with temporary or seasonal jobs. In an economy where seasonal jobs are common,
the hypothesis that welfare is being utilised as a form of unemployment insurance19 or perhaps
being incorporated in an implicit contract setting with employers deserves further research.
5. Characteristics of Returns to Welfare
Our finding that welfare exits exhibit a seasonal pattern for some demographic groups
suggests that repeat users of welfare exhibit a different spell distribution than those who only
receive IA once in our sample. Figure 5.1 presents welfare exit rates broken down into single
users of the welfare system versus multiple users where we disaggregate by whether the family
is employable or unemployable, single and/or with children. The dotted lines refer to families
with children while the bold lines refer to repeat users of the system. For employable singles
and couples, with or without children, the hazard rates for first time versus repeat users of
welfare are not different. For the unemployable group, we see that repeat users with children
19
'. That is, such jobs may be not be covered by the regular Unemployment Insurance program, or at
least the workers are only able to establish short duration claims.
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have slightly shorter spells. The survivor functions presented in Table 5.1 shows that the
differences in the spell lengths for first time versus repeat users are small.
6. Conclusions
This study represents a first step in filling the large gap in knowledge concerning how
individuals and families use social assistance in Canada. Only recently researchers have begun
to examine the decision of lone parent families to participate in Canadian welfare programs using
cross-sectional surveys. The research in this study utilises a unique longitudinal data set derived
from the administration of the welfare programs in British Columbia to examine the dynamics
of Canadian welfare participation.
A number of patterns emerge from the data. First, we find that most welfare spells are
shorter than 6-months while over 10% last longer than a year. Further, almost no welfare cases
last more than four years and those that do involve families with children. Third, single mothers
and fathers have longer spells than either couples (with and without children) or childless single
men and women. Fourth, there have been large changes in the caseload composition: the fraction
of the caseload who are employable has steadily risen from 38% in 1980-82 to 64% in 1991-92,
single males have risen by 10 percentage points from 34% of the caseload in 1980-82 while all
other types of household have fallen and the age structure of the caseload is virtually unchanged
over the decade: over 70% are over age 25. Finally, a quarter of welfare recipients are back on
the welfare rolls within three months of leaving, while a full 50% return within a year. We also
find that for single individuals and couples without children there is a significant fraction of the
population who display a seasonal pattern to their welfare use.
Two important policy issues are raised by the findings in this paper. First, for the large
16
majority of recipients, "welfare dependence", defined in terms of remaining on welfare for a long
period of time, does not accurately characterise their experience on welfare. Most spells are
relatively short. However the very high incidence of repeat use, especially within the first year
after leaving welfare, highlights the need for governments to implement more pro-active labour
market policies targeted to these individuals to help them become independent and permanently
self-sufficient. It also questions whether welfare is acting as a wage subsidy to employers and
employees enganged in employment agreements which implicitly incorporate features of the
welfare system when setting wage and employment levels. Secondly, there is a subset of single
parent families who do remain on the welfare roll for several continuous years. This group
account for an important fraction of the caseload at a point in time and for a substantial portion
of the welfare budget over a period of time. It is likely these families face significant fixed costs
of employment and that there are substantial disincentives to entering the labour market in terms
of forgone welfare services and income. As raised by Bane and Ellwood (1994) in the US
context, an important issue for public debate is whether it is desirable that welfare acts as a
subsidy to these families or whether a more effective policy targeted specifically at this group,
taking account of their special needs and characteristics, would be more efficient.
Future work needs to be undertaken to understand whether unobserved heterogeneity and
other labour supply characteristics may account for our findings of negative duration dependence.
Another factor which needs to be understood is the relationship between the UI and IA systems:
how much IA use is generated by UI exhaustion, and how much use of IA represents the choice
of rational individuals selecting IA when it is more generous than UI? Both of these issues have
important implications for design of reforms to both the UI and IA programs. Finally, we need
17
to develop a better understanding as to why the B.C. caseload has risen so dramatically in the
early 1980s and 1990s. Does the rise in caseload arise from a change in the entry rates into
welfare, changes in the eligible population, a lengthening of spells, and/or an increase in the
repeat use of welfare? Is there a problem that individuals who would have previously been
covered by UI are now being forced to rely on welfare while between jobs or is IA being
integrated into the compensation packages in seasonal industries?
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Source: National Council of Welfare (1993a).
Notes: The Northwest Territories are not included in the table since it was not possible to obtain
average cost estimates for shelter rates in Yellowknife. The actual costs of rent, heating and
utilities are paid under the territorial welfare program.


































































































Source: Canada Assistance Plan, Annual Report 1970-1992.
Notes: (1) The figures correspond to the number of recipients of general social assistance for the month of March of each
fiscal year.
(2) The Northwest Territories did not establish welfare programs under CAP until 1973-74.



































































































Source: Canada Assistance Plan, Annual Report 1970-1992.
Notes:{\) The amounts correspond to two times the Federal Governments payments to the provinces and territories for
general assistance under C.A.P.for the respective fiscal years.
(2) The figures are not available due to the Federal Government's ceiling on total payments under the C.A.P.
Table 1.4 Welfare Benefits in British Columbia (1992 constant dollars).
Household Type 1986 1989 1990 1992
Single Employable














Source: National Council of Welfare (1993a:34).
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Figure 3.1 - Kaplan-Meier Welfare Exit Rates
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Figure 4.1 - Kaplan-Meier Return to Welfare Rates
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